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Ampliación de la competencia de la UE  
en materia penal mediante políticas.  
La Directiva antifraude como caso de estudio
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The present contribution discusses the emergence of a multi-level system of 
criminal justice in the EU and the role of constitutional conflicts ensuing from that. 
Taking inspiration from Paolo Carrozza’s contribution on the enduring role of Hans 
Kelsen, the paper analyses the enlarging of EU competences in criminal law to pur-
sue the effectiveness of EU policies.
Keywords
Criminal justice; EU competences; Kelsen; effectiveness.
* Cómo citar / Citation ‘Chicago-Deusto’ (Autor-fecha / Author-date / Lista de refe-
rencias / Reference list entries): Mancano, Leandro. 2019. “Enlarging EU Competence in 
Criminal Matters through Policies. The Anti-Fraud Directive as a Case Study”. Estudios 
de Deusto 67, n.º 1: 97-110. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ed-67(1)-2019pp97-110.
Enlarging EU Competence in Criminal Matters through Policies. The Anti-Fraud Directive… Leandro Mancano
Estudios de Deusto 
© Universidad de Deusto • ISSN 0423-4847 • ISSN-e 2386-9062, Vol. 67/1, enero-junio 2019, págs. 97-110
http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ed-67(1)-2019pp97-110 • http://www.revista-estudios.deusto.es/98 2
Resumen
Se discute el surgimiento de un sistema de justicia penal en múltiples niveles en 
la UE y el papel de los conflictos constitucionales resultantes de ello. Inspirándose en 
la contribución de Paolo Carrozza sobre el papel perdurable de Hans Kelsen, el docu-
mento analiza la ampliación de las competencias de la UE en Derecho penal para 
perseguir la eficacia de las políticas europeas.
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III. BuIldIng pIllars across the eu. IV. from tampere to am-
sterdam: the hIgh-speed raIl of eu crImInal law By mutual rec-
ognItIon. V. mergIng pIllars: the hague programme, the envi-
ronMent CriMe and the Ship SourCe pollution judgments. VI. the 
day after tomorrow. VII. the dIrectIVe on the protectIon of the 
eu fInancIal Interests. VIII. conclusIons.
I. INTRODUCTION
EU criminal law is one of the most interesting areas to study the enduring 
influence of Kelsen’s thought on jurists and lawyers upheld by Paolo Carroz-
za.1 EU criminal law has only seen an increase in the level of interaction 
between the Union and state legal framework. The end of the so called tran-
sitional period in 2014 following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has 
brought about considerable changes to the legal regimes of measures of EU 
criminal law. Before that date, ‘third pillar’ acts2 would present two main 
flaws: the Commission could not use its power of enforcement under article 
258 TFEU against Member States’ failure of implementation; the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had no competence in issuing prelim-
inary rulings on these acts, unless the concerned Member State had explicitly 
accepted it. Conversely, mentioned defects are absent from post-Lisbon rules 
enacted in such realm, due to the criminal law’s ‘communitarisation’ brought 
to completion by the Treaty reform.
The strengthened value of instruments of EU criminal law raises ques-
tions on possible conflicts between EU and state competences, on the one 
hand; on the other, there is the issue of Union law possibly lowering the 
standard of fundamental rights protection as enshrined in member states. 
This paper reconstructs the progressive emergence of the EU as a major role 
for establishing priorities in terms of criminalisation through encroaching 
upon member states powers. Through the example of the recently adopted 
PIF Directive, it also shows that the communitarisation of EU criminal law 
carried out by the treaty of Lisbon has not removed the possibility of conflicts 
between the two levels of governance.
1 Paolo Carrozza, «Kelsen and Contemporary Constitutionalism: The Continued 
Presence of Kelsenian Themes», in this issue.
2 Namely, measures of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters passed 
before the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force.
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II.  THE GREEK MAIZE CASE. NAMELY, THE CORNERSTONE OF 
THE ‘FUNCTIONALIST JOURNEY’ OF EU CRIMINAL LAW
The coming into being of EU criminal law can be partly told through the 
functionalist approach endorsed by the Court of Justice. The start of this 
approach may be traced back to Commission v. Greece3 litigation, better 
known as Greek Maize case. The Court was faced with a case of fraud against 
Community budget by a Member State where such wrongdoing had not been 
criminalized. The judges, by founding their reasoning on the principle of 
loyal cooperation,4 required Member States to take all measures necessary to 
guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law. Member 
States are required to comply with that principle and thus ensure that 
‘infringements of Community law [are] penalized under conditions, both 
procedural and substantive, which [are] analogous to those applicable to 
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, 
in any event, [make] the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.5
The Court established criteria for Member States’ action. Firstly, the 
principle of assimilation was stated, namely the duty to treat Community law 
violations with analogous means to those they would use to address compa-
rable violations of national law. Secondly, Member States were required to 
react through effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, to be enforced 
with the same diligence that applied to national situations.
Since then, the Greek Maize ‘formula’ has been heavily relied on by the 
ECJ in its judgments, as well as in a great deal of legislative instruments.6 The 
exceptional nature of the judgement at issue lies in recognizing to the EC an 
‘indirect’ competence in criminal matters even before the Treaty of Maastricht.
III.  BUILDING PILLARS ACROSS THE EU
The Treaty of Maastricht7 built the pillars-based institutional framework 
of EU, with the latter being conferred a competence in criminal matters, 
though very limited and outside Community law. However, thorny issues 
arose from the introduction of such a power to legislate in criminal matters. 
On the one hand, a plethora of measures in this area were approved; on the 
other, these instruments proved to be not extremely effective, and cumber-
some in their adoption. Indeed, both Joint Actions and Conventions (the 
3 Case C-68/88 Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 2965.
4 Former article 5 EC, present article 4(3) TEU.
5 Fn 3 above, para 23.
6 See Henry Labayle, «L’ouverture de la jarre de Pandore: réflexion sir la compétence 
de la Communauté en matière pénale» (2006) 42 Cahiers de droit europeén 387.
7 OJ C 224 of 31 August 1992.
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main ways used to adopt EU criminal legislature at that time) were mostly 
international law instruments. In that context, two main approaches emerged: 
the Commission would put forward a legislation ratione functionis, that is to 
say criminal law under first pillar, in order to ensure the effectiveness of 
Community law and policies; whereas the second, espoused by the Council 
and many Member States, stood in favor of a ratione materiae logic, so that 
criminal legislation should have been approved under the ‘third pilar’, if 
weaker.
Such discrepancy came to the fore as early as the very beginnings of EU 
criminal law, and exactly with regard to the fight against fraud relating to the 
Community budget. In particular, the well-known Corpus Iuris (a sort of 
mini-criminal code attempting to unify Member States’ laws in that subject) 
was at stake.8 However, the project never saw the light of day, and was 
replaced by the Convention for the protection of the financial interests of the 
European Communities and accompanying protocols9 (hereinafter, referred 
to as the “PIF Convention”).
IV.  FROM TAMPERE TO AMSTERDAM: THE HIGH-SPEED RAIL 
OF EU CRIMINAL LAW BY MUTUAL RECOGNITION
The end of century saw the almost simultaneous adoption of the ‘Tam-
pere Programme’10 and the entering into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
the former represented the moment from which “the Union’s policy in the 
area of justice and home affairs has been developed in the framework of a 
general programme”;11 on the other side, the latter bore significant novelties 
for EU criminal law. Most importantly, it replaced Joint Actions with the 
instrument of Framework Decisions. They needed no ratification by Member 
States and, apart from having no direct effect, presented the same wording as 
Directives in the Treaty. EU criminal law was being provided with a consid-
erable, Community-oriented tool.
The phase started with the Tampere Programme coincided with the so 
called ‘second wave of third pillar’12. As said, the first wave – consisting of 
8 Mireille Delmas-Marty and John Vervaele (eds), The implementation of the Corpus 
Juris in the member states: penal provisions for the protection of European finances (Ant-
werp: Groningen; Oxford, Intersentia, 2000).
9 OJ C 316/49, 27.11.1995; OJ C 313, 23.10.1996 OJ C 195, 25.6.1997; OJ C 151, 
20.5.1997; OJ C 221, 19.7.1997.
10 Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 october 1999, Presidency Conclusions.
11 Thereby the Hague Programme (see below) stipulated at para 1.
12 Valsamis Mitsilegas «The third wave of third pillar» (2009) 34 European Law 
Review 523.
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weaker legislative instruments such as Conventions and Joint Actions – 
stemmed from the Maastricht Treaty had not been accompanied by guide-
lines or programmatic document. Whereas the second wave can be seen as a 
momentum flowing from the born of a European criminal policy. As a result, 
these two pathways may not be decoupled. Conversely, a fil-rouge linked 
Tampere to Amsterdam, namely the building of an area of freedom, security 
and justice by means of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam referred to the development of the Union as an ‘area of free-
dom, security and justice’ as a fundamental objective13 and incorporated the 
Schengen acquis into Community/European Law14.
This development went hand in hand with the ‘journey’ dating from 1998, 
when the UK government, during its EU Presidency, put forward the idea of 
applying the principle of mutual recognition to criminal law. This proposal 
was followed by the well-known Tampere Programme, where the European 
Council adopted the principle of mutual recognition as ‘the cornerstone’ of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Many EU measures in criminal mat-
ters saw the light in that period, both substantial and procedural. Admittedly, 
the new wording of the Treaty as to the Justice and Home Affairs Law mir-
rored the key-features of Tampere Programme, in so far as a major conver-
gence to the aim of judicial cooperation seemed to emerge, at that time. As 
Weyembergh rightly stated, ‘the only function of approximation [of substan-
tial criminal law] which ha[d] received some attention is the auxiliary func-
tion, supporting judicial cooperation’.15 Against that backdrop, significant 
instruments such as the Framework Decision on European Arrest Warrant16 
were adopted. Furthermore, the conjunction between ‘pillar approximation’ 
and ‘pillar dialogue’ brought about noteworthy results. First and foremost, the 
Commission’s initiative to adopt criminal rules against fraud under Commu-
nity legal basis.17 Albeit the proposal was not adopted, other important anti-
fraud related instruments were passed, such as the Framework Decision on 
confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property,18 the 
Framework Decision on money laundering.19
13 See former article 2, Treaty of the European Union.
14 See Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 
13-14.
15 Anne Weyembergh, «Approximation of Criminal Law, the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Hague Programme» (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1574 onwards. 
16 OJ L 190/1 18.7.2002.
17 ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the crim-
inal-law protection of the Community’s financial interests’, Brussels 23.5.2001, (COM) 
2001 272 final.
18 OJ L 68/49, 15.3.2005.
19 OJ L 182/1.
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Such ‘pillars dialogue’ involved another Community polices, with the 
Commission putting forward a Directive on the protection of environment 
through law.20 However, the proposal ended up being adopted as a Frame-
work Decision, because of the opposition of the Council.21 Question as to a 
‘silent’ expansion of EU competence in criminal matters were arising, fos-
tered by a peculiar legislative technique used at the time. According to the 
double-text mechanism, two ‘twin’ instruments were concurrently adopted: a 
Community measure regulating the conduct was complemented by a ‘third 
pillar’ act, introducing sanctions.
V.  MERGING PILLARS: THE HAGUE PROGRAMME, THE 
ENVIRONMENT CRIME AND THE SHIP SOURCE POLLUTION 
JUDGEMENTS
As for the shaping of EU criminal competence through policies is con-
cerned, the Directive22 and the Council Framework Decision on ship source 
pollution are to be recalled.23 In the 2005 Hague Programme24 and follow-up 
documents,25 the EU institutions made it clear that “[t]he approximation of 
substantive criminal law serves the [to facilitate mutual recognition of judg-
ments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters] and concerns areas of particular serious crime with cross border 
dimension”.26
‘Pillars dialogue’ turned into a duel when the Commission decided to 
bring an action before the ECJ for annulment of the Framework Decision on 
the protection of environment through criminal law.27 More precisely, it held 
that Articles 1 to 7 (defining the offenses) should have been adopted accord-
ing to a Community legal basis, rather than under the ‘third pillar’ one. Con-
versely, the Member States and the Council stated that, in the light of criminal 
20 COM (2001) 139 final, Brussels 13 November 2001.
21 OJ L29/55, 5.2.2003
22 OJ L 255/11, 30.9.2005.
23 OJ L 255/211, 29.9.2005.
24 OJ C53/1, 3.3.2005.
25 By way of example, see Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the 
Hague Programme on strengthening freedom, security and justice, Brussels 12.8.2005, OJ 
2005/C 198/1. Communication from the Commission to the Council of the European 
Parliament of 10 May 2005 – The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. 
The partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM 
(2005) 184 final. For other related documents see on http://europa.eu/legislation_summa-
ries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l16002_en.htm
26 Fn 25 above, Para. 3.3.2.
27 Case C-176/03, Commission c. Council, [2005] ECR I-07879.
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law significance for national sovereignty, EC competences should have been 
explicitly conferred upon in the Treaty. The Luxembourg judges struck down 
the Framework Decision, by embracing the Commission’s stance. Firstly, the 
Court referred to Articles 29 and 47 TEU, which stated respectively that third 
pillar action must be ‘without prejudice to the powers of the European Com-
munity and that nothing in the EU Treaty [would] affect the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities’. On that ground, the ECJ established a 
hierarchy among the pillars and recognized the primacy of Community law. It 
followed that, according to the ‘functionalist’ perspective adopted by the 
Court, EC criminal competence could be found, if needed to ensure funda-
mental Community objective (as the environment protection was).
This ground-breaking judgment triggered a knock-on effect. The Com-
mission challenged one important instance of ‘pillars dialogue’, namely the 
Framework Decision on ship-source pollution.28 The Commission, as in the 
Environment crime case,29 argued that part of the Framework Decision (in 
particular, Articles 1 to 10) should have been adopted under the ‘first pillar’ 
legal basis30 and, owing to the indivisible nature of the same act, it should 
have been annulled. The ECJ annulled the Framework Decision. The Court’s 
ruling primarily recognized that the Community’ authority on criminal mat-
ters is exceptional and restricted, on one hand; on the other, it reiterated the 
hierarchy established in Case C-176/03, by using article 47 TCE as a shield 
of ‘first pillar’ supremacy. The ECJ elaborated on such a statements accord-
ing to a ‘functionalist’ logic, and reaffirmed the EC competence ‘when the 
application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by 
the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating seri-
ous environment offences, in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down 
in that field are fully effective’31. The Court clarified the breadth and the 
depth of Community powers in criminal matters, by denying any Community 
entitlement to determine the level of penalty to be applied by Member State,32 
and stipulating that EC rules on criminal law encountered the limit of direct 
effect. As a result, such measure could have been adopted only by means of 
directives.33
28 Case C-440/05, Commission c. Council, [2007] ECR I-09097. See Communication 
on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005’ COM (2005) 583 fi-
nal/2, Brussels, 24.11.2005
29 For a commentary of the judgments, inter alia, see; Elisavet Symeonidou-Casta-
nidou, «Ship-Source Marine Pollution: the ECJ Judgements and their Impact on Criminal 
Law» (2009) 17 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 335.
30 That is to say, Article 80(2) TEC relating to the common transport policy.
31 Fn 28 above, para 60.
32 Fn 28 above, paras 70 and 71.
33 Fn 28 above, para 66.
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VI. THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW
While leaving a number of questions unanswered, the judgment is unani-
mously considered as a milestone of EU law broadly speaking. The follow-up 
was twofold: firstly, directives harmonising criminal laws were adopted.34 
Shortly after, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force,35 legitimating the ‘func-
tionalist’ understanding of EU criminal law. Indeed Article 83(2) TFEU states 
that ‘[i]f the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member 
States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union pol-
icy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, directives 
may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the area concerned’.36
The EU, if intending to pose criminal obligations on Member States also 
with regard to the type and the level of penalties, has been provided with 
appropriate instruments. As a result, instances of further spill-over effect in 
EU criminal law (as the two described judgments) should not be expected. 
However, also in the light of the foregoing, such a statement might legiti-
mately be questioned. The Court has not shied away from stretching the word-
ing and the meaning of the Treaty provisions for reasons related to Union 
policy objectives. Now that the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced an explicit 
– albeit somewhat ambiguous – legal reference to this end, might EU ‘func-
tional’ criminal rules (completely) outside Article 83(2) TFEU be envisaged?
VII.  THE DIRECTIVE ON THE PROTECTION OF THE EU 
FINANCIAL INTERESTS
The PIF Directive is a good example of post-Lisbon dialogue between the 
EU and member states on criminal law competences and fundamental rights 
protection. Three preparatory documents explain the EU’s view on the PIF 
Directive: the Impact Assessment (IA),37 the explanatory memorandum of 
the proposal and the European Parliament (EP) report.38 The IA starts with a 
34 OJ L 328/28, 6.12.2008; OJ L280/52 of 27.10.2009.
35 OJ C 306 of 17 December 2007.
36 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011) at 762 et seq. see also Alessandro Bernardi, L’harmonisation pénale accessoire, in 
Le droit pénal de l’Union Européenne au lendemain du Traité de Lisbonne (Paris, Societé 
de la législation comparée, 2012) at 153-184.
37 See in particular Commission Staff Working Paper, Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of 
the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law, SWD (2012) 196.
38 EP report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting by crim-
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remark on the strong obligation for the EU and the member states to protect 
the Union’s financial interests. The shortcomings of the current legal frame-
work would lie in the little dissuasive effect of the existing provisions and the 
uneven level of enforcement and implementation. The goal of effectiveness 
by deterrence is to be achieved by: extending the range and types of offences; 
harmonizing the sanctions, currently too low and diverse amongst member 
states.39 The foregoing summarises the Union approach to the use of criminal 
law and custodial penalties. On the one hand, an area of free movement is 
sustainable so long as a common set of rules is established. Potential wrong-
doers are therefore deprived of the choice of forum: namely, the possibility 
to move where offending is more convenient due to low enforcement rate, 
mild penalties or narrow definition of the punished conducts. On the other, 
criminal law can unfold its deterring potential through the threat of harsh 
sanctions such as imprisonment.
The Commission identified a directive and a regulation as the two most 
appropriate legislative instruments to be adopted.40 While the former was 
eventually preferred because less intrusive, the latter – and the enactment of 
EU directly applicable rules in criminal law – was not regarded as unlawful. 
Quite the contrary, a regulation would comply with the EU law proportional-
ity principle, owing to the great relevance of the interests at stake.41
That being so, the Commission’s proposal opted for Article 325(4) TFEU 
as its legal basis, stating that ‘The fight against illegal activities affecting the 
Union’s financial interests is a very specific policy area [where] the Union 
has a broad array of tools at its disposal’.42 The EP voiced its disagreement,43 
and secured a change of the legal basis to Article 83(2) TFEU in the final ver-
sion of the text. The EP considered Article 83(2) TFEU lex specialis to Arti-
cle 325(4) TFEU. The travaux préparatoires of Article 83(2) TFEU show 
that the latter provision was considered an appropriate legal basis ‘in the con-
text of the protection of the EU’s financial interests’.44 Additionally, Article 
86 TFEU contains a provision on the establishment of a European Public 
Prosecutor’s office ‘in order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests 
inal law, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA (COM(2013)0042 
– C7-0033/2013 – 2013/0023(COD), A7-0018/2014, 10.1.2014.
39 Fn 38 above, paras 1-3.
40 To be thorough, the options initially presented were five, with three of them being 
ruled out due to their inefficacy (see Para 4).
41 Although, the document clarifies, ‘the intrusiveness and fundamental rights impact 
is higher than [a Directive] for no noticeably higher positive financial impact’ (para 4.1.).
42 Para 3.1.
43 See the Report, p 30 onwards.
44 Para 3.
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of the Union’. The protection of EU’s financial interests, therefore, is by no 
means covered under the sole Article 325 TFEU.
The disappearance, in Article 325 TFEU, of the mentioned prohibition 
provided by Article 280(4) EC can be explained by the communitarisation of 
criminal law competence. Preventing EU measures on fraud from affecting 
national criminal systems would not make sense, within the current institu-
tional framework. Opting for a different legal basis would result in eluding 
the procedural guarantees set in Article 83(2) TFEU.45 The dispute over the 
legal basis reveals the importance of policy legal basis outside the provisions 
in the Treaties strictly devoted to criminal law. The IA reveals that the issue 
behind that discussion concerns possible the direct application of EU rules in 
criminal law and the circumvention of the constraints posed by the EU legis-
lature in Article 83 TFEU. This results in issues of proportionality – which 
the Commission deemed complied with – and legal certainty.
The Commission explained the choice of imprisonment and a minimum 
threshold of deprivation of liberty by arguing that ‘[e]conomic crime is typi-
cally an area where criminal sanctions can have a particularly deterrent 
effect, as potential perpetrators can be expected to make a certain calculation 
of risks before deciding to engage in such criminal activities’.
Issues of legal certainty arise from the dispute on the legal basis and the 
thresholds of punishment laid down in the Directive. The use of Article 325 
TFEU was meant to promote the enlargement of EU competences in criminal 
law through effectiveness of Union’s policies;46 a dynamics well-known 
from the Greek Maize, the Environment Crime and Ship-Source Pollution 
cases. While this debate might appear as pure speculation after the Directive 
was adopted pursuant to Article 83 TFEU, recent development suggests that 
quite the opposite is true. The recourse to policy-based – rather than area-spe-
cific – legal base is not limited to Article 325 TFEU.47
In a 2014 judgment48 concerning Directive 2011/82/EU49 on exchange of 
information between Member States on specific driving offences, the CJEU 
45 Namely, the requirements for harmonising measures to be essential, to establish 
only minimum rules and to be subject to the so called ‘emergency brake’ provided by 
Article 83(4).
46 As to the competence creep, see Stephen Weatherhill, «Competence creep and 
competence control» (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1.
47 For a complete reconstruction of the argumentations concerning the relationship 
between Articles 325 and Article 83 TFEU, see Martin Böse, «La sentenza della Corte 
costituzionale tedesca sul Trattato di Lisbona e il suo significato per la europeizzazione 
del diritto penale» (2009) Criminalia 267.
48 Case C-43/12, European Commission v European Parliament, Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, EU:C:2014:298.
49 OJ L 288/1, 5.11.2011.
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found in favour of the Commission and stated that the Directive should have 
been adopted pursuant to Article 91 TFEU, rather than Article 87(2) TFEU. 
The two legal bases cover transport policy and police co-operation respec-
tively. The CJEU’s consistent preference for the policy legal basis – rather 
than the criminal law-specific one – should not be overlooked.
More closely related to the protection of Union’s financial interests, the 
Taricco saga on Article 325 TFEU has revamped the debate on direct appli-
cability of EU law resulting in establishment of individual criminal liability. 
At stake was the Italian law on the statute of limitation for VAT offences. 
The CJEU stated that a short statute of limitation like the one laid down in the 
Italian law would affect states’ obligations under Article 325(1) and (2) 
TFEU, where that law would: prevent the imposition of dissuasive and effec-
tive penalties in a considerable number of cases; provide a longer period of 
limitation for fraud against the financial interest of the state. The Court stated 
the obligation for national judges to disapply those rules, if needed to ensure 
the effectiveness of Article 325(1) and (2) TFEU. The judgment sparked a 
fierce debate, with – especially Italian – lawyers concerned that the ruling 
might result in direct establishment of criminal liability through EU law and 
circumvention of the principle of legal reserve (or nulla poena sine lege par-
lamentaria) established in Article 25(2) of the Italian Constitution.
The issue arrived before the Italian Constitutional Court, which referred 
three questions to the CJEU asking – for what is concerned here – whether 
the obligation of disapplication stated in Taricco should be upheld even 
where that would be at variance with the overriding principles of the consti-
tution of the member state concerned or with the inalienable rights of the 
individual conferred by the constitution of the member state. The CJEU reaf-
firmed the obligation, unless that disapplication entailed a breach of the prin-
ciple that offences and penalties must be defined by law because of the lack 
of precision of the applicable law or because of the retroactive application of 
legislation imposing conditions of criminal liability stricter than those in 
force at the time the infringement was committed.50 While the Court seemed 
to retreat in Taricco II, it did so without relying on the principle of legal 
reserve. Consistently with its consistent case-law,51 the CJEU focussed on 
foreseeability, legal precision and non-retroactivity.52
50 Case C-42/17, Criminal proceedings against M.A.S. and M.B, EU:C:2017:936, 
para 62.
51 Case C-80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, [1987] ECR 03969, para 13; Case C-68/95, 
Arcaro, [1996] ECR I-06065, para 36-37; joined Cases C-74/95 and 129/95, X, [1996] 
ECR I-06609, para 25; Case 384/02 Knud Grøngard, [2005] ECR I-09939, para 29-30; 
joined Cases 387/02, 391/02, 403/02, Berlusconi and other, [2005] I-03565, para 74.
52 Fn 50 above, para 49.
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The adoption of a criminal law Regulation – explicitly regarded as propor-
tionate by the Commission53 – and the scenario envisaged in Taricco are differ-
ent. They both, however, reveal the uniqueness of custodial penalties in EU law: 
imposition of imprisonment terms through direct application of Union rules for 
reasons of effectiveness. The CJEU’s argued that criminal liability deriving 
from direct applicability of Article 325 TFEU/disapplication of rules on pre-
scription have a procedural effect, whereas the principle of legality would 
regard substantive criminal law. The argument is too formalistic. Furthermore, 
it might be objected that the obligation refers to effective and dissuasive sanc-
tions broadly. The previous discussion revealed, however, that no penalties are 
considered as effective and dissuasive as those entailing deprivation of liberty.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The dialogue between the EU institutions and member states on EU crim-
inal law shows the difficulties in allocating competence on the best-placed 
level of governance. It also reveals conflicts that can arise when it comes to 
different understanding of very important fundamental rights. The dispute 
over the legal basis has brought to the fore once again the issue of the bypass-
ing of the limits settled by the Treaty and the enlargement of EU criminal 
competences through policies. A sort of circularity seems to surface: a cer-
tain policy is outweighed because the legal basis prioritizes it; and the other 
way around, the same policy serves to ‘pick’ the legal basis, which is in turn 
used to extend EU competences. Indeed, to require no ‘essentiality’ for 
enacting criminal measures, or to deprive Member States of the ‘emergency 
brake’ would amount to strikingly empower the EU in this respect. However, 
what it is most important remained unsaid in the institutional dialogue above 
described. The potential groundbreaking stays behind the concerns voiced by 
the EP, and regards the proposal of directly applicable criminal rules. As 
shown, the impact assessment implicitly accepted such a possibility, refer-
ring to a hypothetic penal regulation as ‘a single, immovable set of rules […] 
with exhaustive definitions of offenses and rigid sanction types and levels 
[…] that Member States’ authority wold apply directly’ (emphasis added).54 
Apart from being difficult to imagine how Member States could apply it 
directly (particularly as far as the penalties is concerned55), the CJEU’s case 
53 Samuli Miettinen, Implied ancillary criminal law competence, (2013) 3 European 
Criminal Law Review 194.
54 See the impact assessment, para 4.2.
55 Indeed, to require ‘imprisonment’, by way of example, could not suffice. In Italy, 
for instance, there are different types of imprisonment, depending on the type of crime 
committed.
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law has consistently excluded that criminal liability can be established or 
aggravated directly on the basis of EU rules. However the Court, grounding 
its decisions on legal certainty and non-retroactivity,56 has brought about a 
somewhat ‘autonomous’ concept of principle of legality, so stand stilling and 
innovating in the same breath. This is even more true on looking at Member 
States’ that recognize the nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria as a constitu-
tional principle. The Taricco saga, concerning the direct applicability of Arti-
cle 325 TFEU to trump national criminal law at the expenses of the individual, 
confirms the Court’s consistent approach.
Should the EU be conferred upon the power to adopt directly applicable 
criminal rules, one might find that a complete (and, perhaps, definitive) inte-
gration as with criminal law would be achieved, given the paramount task 
which the principle of direct effect has performed in promoting the EC/EU 
project from Van Gend en Loos onwards.57
56 Case C-80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, [1987] ECR 03969, para 13; Case C-68/95, 
Arcaro, [1996] ECR I-06065, para 36-37; joined Cases C-74/95 and 129/95, X, [1996] 
ECR I-06609, para 25; Case 384/02 Knud Grøngard, [2005] ECR I-09939, para 29-30; 
joined Cases 387/02, 391/02, 403/02, Berlusconi and other, [2005] I-03565, para 74. 
57 Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR.
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